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Immigration-In re Sandoval: Deportation and the
Exclusionary Rule
For more than fifty years, courts have generally assumed that evi-
dence seized by immigration officers pursuant to an illegal search is
subject to suppression in a deportation proceeding.' During this pe-
riod, the federal courts as well as immigration judges and the Board of
Immigration Appeals have often made reference to the applicability of
the exclusionary rule, but, with one exception,2 they have never had
occasion to order the exclusion of illegally seized evidence.3 In In re
Sandoval,4 the Board of Immigration Appeals, faced with a prima facie
showing of an illegal search, thoroughly analyzed the history and ap-
propriateness of applying the exclusionary rule to deportation proceed-
ings. For the first time, evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search of
an alien's home was held to be admissible in a deportation hearing.5
In Sandoval, Immigration and Naturalization Service agents con-
ducted an illegal search of respondent Sandoval's apartment.6 While
still in her apartment, respondent was questioned by the agents and
admitted being a Mexican citizen unlawfully in the United States.
Once in custody, she signed an affidavit again admitting her illegal sta-
tus;7 this admission was incorporated in a standardized form8 that was
later used as evidence in her deportation hearing. 9 Relying on respon-
1. See Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923); C. GoRDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMI-
GRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 5.2(a)-(C), 9.41 (1959); Fragomen, ProceduralAspects of Illegal
Search and Seizure in Deportation Cases, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 151, 163, 188 & n. 117 (1976).
2. Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1977); see notes 43 & 44 and accompany-
ing text infra.
3. See, e.g., Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1978); Cordon de Ruano v. INS, 554
F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1977); Aguirre v. INS, 553 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1977); Ho Chong Tsao v. INS, 538
F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977); In re Tsang, 14 1. & N. Dec. 294 (1973);
In re Wong, 13 I. & N. Dec. 820 (1971). There have been cases, however, in which the courts have
ordered, or have said they would order, the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of an unlaw-
ful arrest from a deportation hearing. See, eg., Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir.
1959).
4. No. 2725 (Bd. Immigration App., Aug. 20, 1979).
5. Id, slip op. at 17.
6. At 6 a.m. on August 6, 1975, Immigration and Naturalization agents arrived at respon-
dent Sandoval's apartment house, opened the door to her third floor apartment area, knocked
after they had already entered, and then proceeded to conduct a warrantless search. According to
the record, no consent was given for the search. Id at 5.
7. Although the Board found the 68-page record unclear on this point, id., respondent ap-
parently admitted her unlawful status prior to being taken into custody and again after her arrival
at an Immigration Service office. See id.
8. INS Form 1-213 (Record of Deportable Alien).
9. In re Sandoval, No. 2725, slip op. at 5.
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dent's verbal admission and the information contained in the standard-
ized form, the immigration judge ordered respondent deported for
entering the United States illegally.'"
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, respondent ar-
gued that her admission of illegal alienage and her affidavit of admis-
sion included in the standardized form should be suppressed as
evidence obtained in violation of her fourth amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures."' The Board, affirming theimmigration judge's ruling, held that "[n]either legal [n]or policy con-
siderations dictate the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence from
these proceedings."' 2
In its decision the Board first reaffirmed the generally accepted
principle that deportation is in its nature a civil proceeding not a crimi-
nal one, 3 and noted that the United States Supreme Court has
"'never. . .applied [the exclusionary rule] to exclude evidence from a
civil proceeding, federal or state.' 14 In response to respondent's argu-
ment that the rule should be extended to deportation proceedings, the
Board pointed out that the exclusionary rule is "'a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
10. Id. at 3; see 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976). The statute provides in pertinent part that any
alien shall be deported who "entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place
other than as designated by the Attorney General." Respondent was also later charged with fail-
ing to establish the date, manner and place of her entry, in violation of Id. § 1361 (1976). In re
Sandoval, No. 2725, slip op. at 3.
11. In re Sandoval, No. 2725, slip op. at 5-6. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963).
Respondent also claimed that her admission of illegal alienage made at the deportation hear-
ing was elicited from her in violation of her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
and that the deportation judge was biased. She claimed the judge acted with "flagrantly injudi-
cious conduct" resulting in a denial of her due process rights. Slip op. at 18 n.24. The Board
agreed that respondent's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been denied,
but failed to find any evidence in the record of judicial misconduct resulting in a denial of a
fundamentally fair hearing. See id. at 4 & n.l, 18.
12. Inre Sandoval, No. 2725, slip op. at 17. Dissenting Board Member Appleman took issue
with this conclusion by pointing out that "8 C.F.R. 287.3 bears indigenous seeds for motions to
suppress for failure to follow correct arrest procedures." Id. at 29 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1979)).
Section 287.3 provides that within 24 hours of a warrantless arrest, an alien must be presented to a
district INS director for a determination whether there is prima facie evidence that the arrested
alien is in the United States unlawfully. He also argued that
[t]he published decisions [of the Board] are replete with discussion of the admissibility of
evidence challenged on the ground of illegal arrest and search-discussion which would
be surplusage if the Board were not applying and following the exclusionary rule. It is
totally irrelevant that the rule has been followed and applied, sometimes expressly, and
sometimes by implication. The rule has been followed. There is no question whatsoever
that this is the case.
Id. at 30.
13. Id. at 10 & n.12.
14. Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976)).
DEPORTATION
through its deterrent effect,'" and that the need for the rule is "'strong-
est where the Government's unlawful conduct would result in imposi-
tion of a criminal sanction on the victim of the search.' "15 The Board
reasoned that, if the rule is to be extended to a particular civil proceed-
ing, the "likelihood of deterring misconduct by government officials
[must outweigh] the societal costs imposed by rendering unavailable
clearly probative and reliable evidence." '16
Pursuing this rationale, the Board further reasoned that because
Immigration and Naturalization Service agents are empowered to en-
force laws that often carry both civil and criminal penalities,17 applying
the exclusionary rule would not have additional deterrent value on
agents already aware that illegally seized evidence could not be used in
subsequent criminal proceedings.18 While conceding that excluding il-
legal evidence at a deportation proceeding "at first appearance" would
have the same deterrent effect on law enforcement officials as excluding
such evidence from a criminal proceeding, the Board found that the
civil nature of deportation made the need for the rule less compelling
than in criminal prosecutions.' 9
In addition, the Board noted that deportation is often based on an
alien's present illegal "status," not his past actions or misconduct. If
the rule were applicable and evidence such as the admissions in Sando-
val were suppressed in deportation cases based on an alien's status, the
government would, in many cases, only need to establish the alien's
identity and alienage, and then the burden would shift to the alien to
prove the time, place and manner of entry.2" Therefore, said the
Board, "[i]t is not clear that the application of the exclusionary rule
would significantly impact on [an] officer's judgment because what is
often the most damaging evidence resulting from an illegal search (the
alien's 'body') cannot be suppressed."'" Further, the Board found that
15. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 11; see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(d)-(e), 1282(c), 1304(e), 1306, 1324-1328, 1357(a)(4)
(1976).
18. Slip op. at 13-14; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (evidence
suppressed); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (evidence admitted); United
States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 34-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
19. Slip op. at 12.
20. Id. at 12-13; see 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
21. Slip op. at 13. The "person" of the alien and his identity, even if considered evidence
seized pursuant to an illegal search, have almost never been held subject to suppression or suffi-
cient to invalidate a deportation proceeding. See Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d 735, 738, modfed,
586 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (identifying papers discovered pursuant to an illegal search); Katris v.
INS, 562 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1977) (admission, but noting that there was no evidence to sup-
1980]
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there were more effective alternatives to deterring agents' illegal con-
duct that would not result in the exclusion of reliable evidence from
deportation hearings.22
Focusing on society's interest in having the information available
and the potential costs of excluding it, the Board reasoned that to ex-
clude probative evidence, and thereby possibly avoid deportation of an
alien unlawfully in the United States, could result in sanctioning a con-
tinuous violation of the immigration laws. This, the Board found, dif-
fers significantly from excluding evidence in a criminal proceeding in
which the crime is a past event, not an ongoing violation.23 Also, to
divert attention from the issue of the alien's immigration "status" to
complicated fourth amendment questions would exact a high societal
cost. According to the Board, application of the rule would create nu-
merous problems of delay and administrative inconvenience because
administrative judges have little expertise in complex legal analysis, ad-
ministrative procedures are inadequate to handle suppression motions,
hearings would be prolonged, and records on appeal would be long and
confusing.24
The Immigration and Naturalization Service has long asserted,
and the federal courts have upheld, the government's absolute author-
ity to deport aliens who, by virture of their status, are unlawfully in the
United States, or who, while legally in the United States, act in viola-
tion of federal immigration laws.25 In short, an alien's stay in the
press); Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d 666, 667 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Huerta-Cabrera v. INS,
466 F.2d 759, 761 n.5 (7th Cir. 1972) (body). Butsee Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F.2d 166, 168-
69 (1st Cir. 1977) (no authority to make Crewman's Landing permit admissible if obtained by an
illegal search).
22. Slip op. at 15-17. The Board suggested three possible, and in its opinion more effective,
alternatives to deterring Immigration agent misconduct: (1) the alien may lodge a formal com-
plaint against the agent with the latter's superior-most likely the District Director, an officer
authorized to direct administration and enforce laws within his operational area, as provided in 8
C.F.R. § 100.20) (1979); (2) if the violation is based on an Immigration Service policy, the alien
may challenge the policy in federal court by seeking an injunction or writ of mandamus to deter
future misconduct; or (3) as in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the alien may file a civil action directly against the individual
officer.
23. Slip op. at 15.
24. Id. at 14-15.
25. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). Although Congress
has plenary power in this area, the executive branch also has wide discretion in administering
Immigration Acts. This discretion is well illustrated by President Carter's recent order requiring
the Attorney General to identify Iranian students in the United States who are not maintaining
their status as students and to commence deportation steps against them. The Attorney General
subsequently enacted regulations requiring all Iranian students to report their status to the federal
immigration service and stated that deportation proceedings would be commenced against all
those who were in the United States illegally or who failed to report. 94 Fed. Reg. 65,727 (1979)
[Vol. 58
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United States is not a right, "but is a matter of permission and toler-
ance"26 subject to revocation by the government.
An alien charged with violating an immigration law does, how-
ever, have the right to a full and fair administrative hearing to deter-
mine his deportability.27 During this civil proceeding, the alien has
been granted by statute and judicial decree certain procedural rights
and safeguards 28; in addition, the hearing is subject to review by the
federal courts to ensure that these "elementary standards of fairness
and reasonableness" are met and that the alien has been afforded due
process of law 9.2  The Supreme Court has consistently warned that
aliens are entitled to the protection of the Constitution and laws of the
United States with respect to their rights of person and property, and
that aliens are generally entitled to this protection in both criminal and
civil proceedings against them. 0
(to be codified in 8 C.F.R. § 214.5). Although a federal district court judge ordered an immediate
halt to the order on the ground that Iranian students were denied equal protection of the law by
being singled out on the basis of nationality from among all other foreign students in the United
States, Navrenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1979), on appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order was reasonably
related to the Attorney General's duties under the Immigration and Nationalization Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (1976), and that these distinctions on the basis of national origin by the executive branch
met the rational basis test. 48 U.S.L.W. 2434 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 1979).
26. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
28. Id. § 1252(b)(l)-(4). These rights are as follows:
(1) the alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circumstances, of the
nature of the charges against him and of the time and place at which the proceedings will
be held;
(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall
choose;
(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against
him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by
the government; and
(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable,
substantial and probative evidence.
Id See, e.g., In re Sandoval, slip op. at 4 & n.l (alien afforded protection of fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 151 n.6 (1945) (recorded
statement made by alien and taken by Immigration officers must be made under oath and signed
by alien).
29. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 336 (1932); see Bridges v. Wixon 326 U.S.
135, 152 (1945) ("The [procedural] rules are designed to protect the interest of the alien and to
afford him due process of law."); Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1979)("de-
portation proceedings must conform to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due proc-
ess"); Sonenreich & Pinco, The Inspector Knocks: Admistrative Inspection Warrants under an
Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24 Sw. L.J. 418, 422 n.28 (1970) (listing cases holding that aliens
are entitled to due process rights at deportation hearings).
30. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1952) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting) (list of Supreme Court cases recog-
nizing various protections afforded an alien under the United States Constitution).
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While it has generally been clear that an alien facing deportation
is entitled to some of the protections of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, 31 it is also well established that he is not entitled to the full pan-
oply of criminal procedural safeguards.32  The question whether the
fourth amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures and its judicially created remedy, the exclusionary rule, is ap-
plicable in a deportation hearing has never been fully settled.3
In United States v. Wong Quong Wong,34 the earliest case squarely
confronting the issue, a federal district court held that personal letters
contradicting respondent's claim of citizenship were seized pursuant to
an illegal search and, therefore, could not be used as evidence in a de-
portation proceeding.35 In Ex Parte Jackson,36 similar reasoning was
applied by another district court to suppress pamphlets advocating the
overthrow of the government that had been seized pursuant to an ille-
gal search.37
The first word from the United States Supreme Court, and cer-
tainly the most cited of all alien-related search and seizure cases, came
in the 1923 case of Bilokumsky v. Tod.38 In Bilokumsky, appellant was
ordered deported for distributing materials advocating the overthrow
of the government in violation of a federal statute.39 Although the
Court upheld the deportation on the separate ground that appellant
was an alien in the United States without lawful admittance, the court
assumed, without analysis, that "evidence obtained by the Department
through an illegal search and seizure cannot be made the basis of a
31. See authorities cited notes 28-30 supra. For a good, but somewhat dated, general discus-
sion, see Developments in the Law. Immigration and Nationaliy, 66 HARV. L. REv. 643 (1953).
For a good historical development of the constitutional rights of resident aliens, see Comment,
7he 41ien and the Constitution, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 547 (1953).
32. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960); United States v. Castro-Tirado, 407 F.
Supp. 210, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
33. Wasserman, Grounds andProcedures Relating to Deportation, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 125,
139-40 (1975). See generally Fragomen, Searchingfor Illegal Aliens: The Immigration Service
Encounters the Fourth Amendment, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 82 (1975).
34. 94 F. 832 (D. Vt. 1899).
35. Id. at 834.
36. 263 F. 110 (D. Mont. 1920).
37. The court in Jackson held that "deportation proceedings are unfair and invalid, [if] they
are based upon evidence and procedure that violate the search and seizure and due process clauses
of the Constitution." Id at 112-13.
38. 263 U.S. 149 (1923) (Supreme Court affirmed district court order denying alien's petition
for habeas corpus relief).
39. Id. at 150; see Act of Oct. 16, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-221, §§ 1-2, 40 Stat. 1012, as amended




finding in deportation proceedings."4
It is this assumption that led many jurists and immigration schol-
ars to believe that the question was well settled.4" Over the course of
the next fifty years, the Immigration Board and federal courts often
paid deference to the Bilokumsky assumption in search and seizure sit-
uations, but no alien was able to establish that his fourth amendment
rights had been violated.42 Finally, in 1977, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, in Wong Chung Che v. INS,43 found that
appellant had made out a prima facie case of illegal search and seizure.
On the premise that "illegally searched and seized evidence cannot be
used in a deportation proceeding," the-court remanded the case to the
Board for an evidentiary hearing on appellant's motion to suppress.44
Faced with this scant history of assumed applicability of the exclu-
sionary rule, the Board in Sandoval made the first thorough analysis of
past law and of the appropriateness of applying the rule in deportation
proceedings. Although the Board's analysis may make sense in a hear-
ing to determine the lawful or unlawful "status" of an alien found in
the United States, its logic and constitutionality is drawn into question
if it is also intended to be applied to aliens legally in the United States
whose misconduct subjects them to deportation. In order to differenti-
ate between application of the rule in criminal as opposed to civil pro-
ceedings, the Board mentioned the difference between deportation
cases that involve "solely the question of a respondent's present status,
as distinguished from criminal proceedings where the issues generally
relate to a defendant'spast actions.'45 The Board's recognition of this
distinction could provide a basis for distinguishing between "status"
and "misconduct" deportation as well. Other courts, prior to Sandoval,
have hinted at this distinction.46
40. 263 U.S. at 155.
41. See authorities cited note I supra; Fragomen, supra, note 33, at 89-90.
42. See cases cited note 3 supra.
43. 565 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1977). In Wong Chung Che, alien crewmen, who had been permit-
ted to stay in the United States for 29 days after arrival, were taken in handcuffs from a Chinese
restaurant to their apartment by Immigration agents. The agents entered the apartment without
consent or warrants, searched it and seized certain entry forms and documents found therein. All
documents used as evidence in their deportation hearing, however, came from Immigration Ser-
vice files except one landing permit giving the date of arrival in the United States, which was
seized in the search and showed that the crewmen had overstayed their permit time.
44. Id. at 169. The court said that illegally seized evidence should be suppressed in a depor-
tation proceeding because "we can think of no justification by necessity for encouraging illegal
searches of premises. There is no doubt that, if the landing permit was obtained through an illegal
search, its admission into evidence infected the deportation proceeding." Id.
45. Slip op. at 12.
46. See, e.g., Smith v. Morris, 442 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Although refusing to apply
1980]
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The Board relied heavily on its rationale that a deportation hear-
ing is civil in nature and, therefore, that the exclusionary rule is not
applicable.47 If applied to lawfully admitted aliens, however, this ra-
tionale fails to consider fully the reasoning in numerous cases in which
the rule has been held applicable to civil proceedings.48 In these cases,
the courts have reasoned that the rule does have a potential deterrent
effect when the penalty under the civil proceeding is quasi-criminal in
character,49 the particular enforcement agency itself can use the evi-
dence in either a criminal or civil proceeding50 or the illegally seized
evidence is the only evidence available to establish a violation of civil
law.51
In situations in which the civil penalty may be characterized as a
quasi-criminal punishment, the courts have been more willing to apply
the exclusionary rule. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,-2
for example, the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to bar
illegally seized evidence in a civil forfeiture proceeding involving the
violation of a Pennsylvania liquor control statute.53 The Court
reasoned that the rule should apply because the forfeiture was essen-
tially an alternative punishment to available criminal sanctions.54 The
the exclusionary rule to a deportation proceeding in which the issue was the lawfulness of the
alien's status, the court indicated that the distinction between "status" and "misconduct" could
make a difference in the applicability of the rule:
[I]t would nevertheless seem that the exclusionary rule serves no useful purpose in any
deportation proceeding in which the decision does not depend upon proof of specific
events, but merely on proof of status. (The possible applicability of the exclusionary rule
in cases where past conduct is crucial-e.g., immoral conduct, criminal conviction, falsi-
fication-need not now be considered.)
Id. at 714.
47. Slip op. at 10, 12-13.
48. See cases cited United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 n.17, 455-56 n.30. In Pizzarello
v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969), the court noted:
Widespread uncertainty is prevalent on the issue of whether evidence, inadmissible in a
criminal case, can be used for other purposes, and the Supreme Court has yet to resolve
the problem . . . . [But] [tihe number of [civil] cases where the exclusionary rule has
been applied is far greater than those where it has not.
Pizzareilo v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969).
49. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (forfeiture proceed-
ing characterized as "quasi-criminal" and thus illegal evidence suppressed). See also Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
50. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969). The Janis Court referred to Pizzarello as one of "[t]he
seminal cases that apply the exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding." 428 U.S. at 456 n.32.
51. Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969).
52. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
53. Id. at 700-01; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-601 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1964).
54. 380 U.S. at 701. The dissent in Sandoail made a similar argument:
"Where as here there is a correlative civil action open to the Government which imposes
1980] DEPORTATION
Court found that "a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in charac-
ter. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commis-
sion of an offense against the law."55 Likewise, when a lawfully
admitted alien is ordered deported for misconduct, the object of the
deportation is to penalize the alien for violating the law.
Many courts have noted the harsh and penal-like nature of a de-
portation order. 6 The Supreme Court has recognized its severe effect
on lawfully admitted aliens, pointing out that "[i]t may result . . . in
loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living,"
57
and that it "is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banish-
ment and exile."'58  Further, the Court has said that for the lawfully
admitted alien "[a] deportation hearing involves issues basic to human
liberty and happiness . . ., perhaps to life itself.''59 Underlying these
statements by the Supreme Court seems to be the recognition that, for
the alien unlawfully in the United States, deportation is often only a
return to the home and family in the country from which he has but
recently come, but for the resident alien who violates certain laws, de-
portation constitutes banishment from what often is, and in many cases
has been for years, his home and all that he cares about.60 Although
a penalty... commensurate with the criminal sanctions to which an accused, victimized
by an illegal search would be exposed, then we see no distinguishable difference between
the two forms of punishment which excuses the government from complying with consti-
tutional mandates when prosecuting their action in a civil forum."
In re Sandoval, slip op. at 31 (quoting United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 182 (N.D. Ohio
1966)).
55. 380 U.S. at 700. The Court went on to say:
It would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal
proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludible, while in the forfeiture proceeding,
requiring the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence
would be admissible .... [Tihe forfeiture is clearly a penalty for the criminal offense
and can result in even greater punishment than the criminal prosecution.
Id. at 701.
56. One district court went so far as to hold that deportation in certain circumstances can be
cruel and unusual punishment, but the decision was overruled without opinion by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
rev'd, 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976), discussed in Note, Defportation of
an 41ien: Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 13 SAN DIEGO L. Rnv.
454 (1975). But see Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964
(1955)(deportation not cruel and unusual punishment).
57. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
58. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S.
388, 391 (1947)).
59. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950).
60. Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals/or Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 309,
310 (1956). Maslow proposes a thorough and, in many ways, radical restructuring of United
States immigration law and policy. Gordon and Rosenfield, in their treatise Immigration Law and
Procedure, also make the point that
[t]he theory of the law is that this [deportation] is simply a protective measure to rid the
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both aliens may be deported for violating immigration laws, their vio-
lations differ in kind as well as degree. Because deportation in miscon-
duct situations has been viewed widely as at least as harsh as, and often
more severe than, an available criminal punishment6 and because, ab-
sent application of the exclusionary rule, immigration agents could vio-
late a resident alien's fourth amendment rights and still effectively
punish him by deportation, the Board's decision in Sandoval should be
limited to.status violations.
In United States v. Janis,6" the Supreme Court's most recent dis-
cussion of the use of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings, the
Court implied that the application of the exclusionary rule in quasi-
criminal situations had been narrowed to "cases in which the officer
committing the unconstitutional search or seizure was an agent of the
sovereign that sought to use the evidence. . . [as opposed to] cases...
where the officer has no responsibility or duty to, or agreement with,
the sovereign seeking to use the evidence."63 In Janis, defendant was
arrested by local police for bookmaking in violation of state law. The
police were acting pursuant to a search warrant that was subsequently
ruled invalid, resulting in the exclusion of all evidence seized pursuant
to the search from the criminal proceeding. Shortly after defendant's
arrest, however, the police contacted Internal Revenue Service agents,
who used the illegally seized evidence to calculate back taxes owed by
defendant on his gambling operation.6' In denying a motion to sup-
press the evidence in a civil tax assessment hearing, the Supreme Court
reasoned that because "[t]he admission of evidence in a federal civil
proceeding is simply not important enough to state criminal law en-
forcement officers to encourage them to violate Fourth Amendment
rights,"65 the exclusion of the evidence would have no additional deter-
rent value and, therefore, should be admissible.
United States of aliens deemed undesirable, and that in any event the deportee is merely
being sent back to his country of origin and allegiance.
This hypothesis is sound enough if the deportee has recently arrived in our midst,
and is being ejected for violating the border or the conditions of his admission. But its
force is weakened when the alien has established roots in this country for many
year.... Although the deportee is not being imprisoned, the consequences to him
sometimes can be far more devastating than criminal punishment.
C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note I, § 4.1(c), at 397. The dissent in Sandoval makes this
same point with equal force. Slip op. at 32 (Appleman, Board Member, dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
61. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
62. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
63. Id. at 455.
64. Id. at 437.,
65. Id. at 458 n.35.
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Because immigration laws often carry criminal as well as civil (de-
portation) sanctions for the same offense, Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service agents are in a position to pursue actions in both
proceedings. 66 By statute, an agent is empowered to "make arrests for
felonies which have been committed and which are cognizable under
any law of the United States regulating the admission, exclusion, or
expulsion of aliens, if he has reason to believe that the person so ar-
rested is guilty of such felony."'67 Many of these felonies also subject
the alien to deportation.68 In addition, an alien can often be deported
on proof of a criminal violation in a deportation proceeding even
though he has not been or is not actually criminally prosecuted.69 In a
Sandoval status situation, immigration agents are generally only con-
cerned with finding illegal aliens and seeing that they are deported, not
with potential criminal prosecutions. In a misconduct situation, how-
ever, agents are interested in seeing that the alien is first criminally con-
victed so that, based on that conviction, the alien can also be deported
in a companion civil proceeding.70 The immigration agent, then, is not
only empowered to enforce but also has a direct and primary interest in
enforcing both criminal and civil violations of the immigration laws.
71
Thus, although the Board used Janis to help justify its holding in San-
doval, use of that precedent is proper only if the Board's decision is
limited to status violations like the one in Sandoval.
The courts have also recognized the applicability of the exclusion-
ary rule when proof of the civil violation depends solely on the illegally
seized evidence. 72 In Pizzarello v. United States,73 a federal district
court applied the exclusionary rule in a tax assessment proceeding be-
cause evidence upon which the tax was assessed had been illegally
seized by Internal Revenue Service agents. The evidence was "in sub-
stantial part, if not in toto"74 the information used by the Service to
discover the amount of taxes owed. Affirming the decision of the dis-
trict court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held:
66. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(4) (1976).
68. See id. § 1357.
69. See, e.g., id § 1251(11)-(12).
70. See id. § 1251.
71. See id § 1357; id. § 1251(a)(4), (I1).
72. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
73. 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969).
74. Id. at 585.
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The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is di-
rected at governmental action. Absent an exclusionary rule, the
Government would be free to undertake unreasonable searches and
seizures in all civil cases without the possibility of unfavorable conse-
quences. In such a situation. . . it seems clear, even under a view of
the law most favorable to the Government, that evidence so obtained
would be excluded. Because Pizzarello's tax assessment was based in
substantial part, if not completely, on illegally procured evidence, the
assessment is invalid.75
By comparison, in a Sandoval status situation, all that need be
shown is the identity and alienage of the alien, which can often be es-
tablished at the deportation proceeding independently of the illegally
seized evidence. Because an illegal arrest does not invalidate a depor-
tation proceeding nor permit the suppression of an alien's "person,"
and because an alien may be compelled to divulge his identity and
alienage, it follows that excluding evidence obtained in an illegal
search would not affect the outcome of a hearing to determine whether
the alien's presence in the United States is lawful.76
When based on misconduct of a lawfully admitted alien, however,
the deportation proceeding falls more nearly into a Pizzarello-type situ-
ation in which the courts have applied the exclusionary rule to civil
proceedings. The illegally obtained evidence often may be the only
available evidence to support the deportation order, and, absent the
evidence, a deportable violation could not be independently estab-
lished. If, for example, an immigration agent illegally seized evidence
of an alien's connection with prostitution 77 or of an alien's illegal use of
addictive, narcotic drugs, 78 the evidence would be subject to suppres-
sion in a criminal proceeding, but, absent application of the exclusion-
ary rule, would not be excluded in a deportation hearing for proof of
the same offense. Because immigration officers are empowered to en-
force both criminal and civil laws concurrently, this type of situation
could frequently occur. Although agents know that evidence seized in
violation of fourth amendment rights will be suppressed in criminal
prosecutions, after Sandoval they may think that the evidence can still
be used in the potentially more severe deportation proceeding. Unless
75. Id at 586.
76. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra. As the Board in Sandoval pointed out, "once
an alien's identity is learned, the service can entirely avoid triggering the exclusionary rule in all
cases where documents lawfully in the Service's possession evidence unlawful presence." Slip op.
at 13.
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(12) (1976).
78. Id. § 1251(a)(11).
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Sandoval is limited to hearings to determine status violations and not
applied to misconduct violations of lawfully admitted aliens, it will
lessen, if not completely undermine, an agent's pre-Sandoval incentive
not to violate fourth amendment rights.
The Board's decision in Sandoval can be viewed as consistent with
case law permitting the admission of illegally obtained evidence in civil
proceedings only if its application is limited to status violations like the
one before the Board in that case. If this is not done, and the exclusion-
ary rule is not applied in deportation proceedings generally, the con-
duct of immigration agents investigating the misconduct of aliens
lawfully admitted to the United States will likely go unchecked. To
sanction the use of illegally seized evidence in a deportation proceeding
when the same evidence cannot be used in a criminal prosecution is
"[t]o visit upon [the lawfully admitted alien] the additional [and more
severe] penalty of deportation [which] is unworthy of a free and power-
ful country."7 9
PAUL BALDASARE, JR.
79. Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Propsaisfor Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309,
323 (1956).
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